Earlier in the semester I read an article called Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine in Wired Magazine (September 2009 Edition) that touches on some interesting aspects of game theory. The article discusses Perimeter--A doomsday machine that guarantees "an automatic Soviet response to an American nuclear strike." In the event that a nuclear attack is detected on Soviet soil, the system unleashes an arsenal of nuclear missiles directed towards the US.
This article ties well into the readings and the class we had on strategic moves. It touches on first move, credibility, deterrence, conditional strategic moves, and the response rule.
From the Soviet perspective, the US had made the first move in escalating the Cold War by announcing that they were going to pursue the SDI program. SDI was a space-based missile defense program that could protect the US from a large scale nuclear attack. Tying this back to the course, this step constitutes a first move because (1) it is observable, and (2) from the Soviet perspective it is irreversible. The Soviet's knew that the US was building more arms, so from their perspective this was a credible move and an indication that the US would soon attack. From Reagan's perspective, the purpose of SDI was to achieve deterrence; he believed it would "bring about lasting peace." The disconnect between the implied intent and the understood intent was the basis for Soviet's reason to create the Dead Hand.
Essentially, the Dead Hand could be the Soviet's conditional strategic move. The Soviet's move is conditional upon America's actions; if America does not attack then the Soviet's won't launch their nuclear warheads, but if they do attack then the Soviet's would retaliate. The retailiation in this case is the response rule. This threat of mutual harm could serve as a deterrence. Of course, I say could in these cases because based on published reports, it does not appear that the US ever knew about the Dead Hand. As the article states "the whole point of the doomsday machine is lost if you keep it a secret!"
Was this a self defeating strategic error? Or did the Soviet's take game theory one step further and play this strategic move to deter their own military from conducting a premature nuclear launch? By guaranteeing retaliation it would lessen the chance of any military officials making a preemptive strike.
